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Abstract: Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the
Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children
to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of)
the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two
mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students
to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable
property of the mechanisms is likely to get distorted. We study the non trivial preference
revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to
be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results
identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee
stability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash
equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two
mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority
students may occupy more preferred schools.
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1 Introduction
School choice is referred in the literature on education as giving parents a say in the choice of
the schools their children will attend. A recent paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
has lead to an upsurge of enthusiasm in the use of matching theory for the design and study
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of school choice mechanisms.1 Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) discuss critical flaws of the
current procedures of some school districts in the US to assign children to public schools. They
point out that the widely used Boston Mechanism has the serious shortcoming that it is not in
the parents’ best interest to reveal their true preferences. Using a mechanism design approach,
they propose and analyze two alternative student assignment mechanisms that do not have this
shortcoming: the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
Real-life school choice situations typically involve a large number of participants and a rel-
atively small number of school programs. For instance, in the school district of New York city
each year more than 90,000 students have to be assigned to about 500 school programs (Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005). Parents are asked to elicit a preference list containing only a limited
number of schools (currently up to 12). This restriction is reason for concern. Since complete
revelation of one’s true preferences is typically no longer an option in this case, the argument
that Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism are strategy-
proof is no longer valid. Imposing a curb on the length of the submitted lists, though certainly
having the merit of “simplifying” matters, has the perverse effect of forcing participants not
to be truthful, and eventually compel them to adopt a strategic behavior when choosing which
ordered list to submit. In other words, we are back in the situation of the Boston Mechanism
where participants are forced to play a complicated admission game. Participants may adopt
strategic behavior because the “quantitative” effect, i.e., participants cannot reveal their com-
plete preference lists, is likely to have a “qualitative” effect, that is, participants may self-select
by not declaring their most preferred options. For instance, if a participant fears rejection by
his most preferred programs, it can be advantageous not to apply to these programs and use
instead its allowed application slots for less preferred programs.
The goal of this paper is to scrutinize the effects of imposing a quota (i.e., a maximal length
of submittable preference lists) on the strategic behavior of students. Thereby we revive an
issue that was initially discussed by Romero-Medina (1998).2 To this end, we study school
choice problems (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) where a number of students has to be
assigned to a number of schools, each of which has a limited capacity of seats. Students have
preferences over schools and remaining unassigned and schools have exogenously given priority
rankings over students.3 We introduce a non trivial preference revelation game where students
can only declare up to a fixed number (the quota) of schools to be acceptable. Each possible
quota, from 1 up to the total number of schools, together with a student assignment mechanism
induces a strategic “quota-game.” We analyze the Nash equilibria and focus on the stability
1Recent papers include Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006),
Chen and So¨nmez (2006), Ergin and So¨nmez (2006), Kesten (2006b), Kojima (2006).
2To the best of our knowledge, Romero-Medina (1998) is the only paper that explicitly analyzes restrictions
on the length of submitted preference lists. He focuses exclusively on the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
and establishes that the set of stable matchings is implemented in Nash equilibria, independently of the quota
(Romero-Medina, 1998, Theorem 7 and Corollary 8). It is true that any stable matching can be sustained at
some Nash equilibrium (the first inclusion in Proposition 6.1). However, in general there are also unstable Nash
equilibrium outcomes (Examples 6.4 and 8.3).
3Very often local or state laws determine the priority rankings. Typically, students who live closer to a school
or have siblings attending a school have higher priority to be admitted at the school. In other situations, priority
rankings may be determined by one or several entrance exams. Then students who achieve higher test scores
in the entrance exam of a school have higher priority for admission at the school than students with lower test
scores.
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of the induced outcomes. Stability is the central concept in the two-sided matching literature4
and does not lose its importance in the closely related model of school choice. Loosely speaking,
stability of an assignment obtains when, for any student, all the schools he prefers to the one
he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher priority. Hence,
if an assignment is not stable then a student can seek legal action against the school district
authorities for not getting assigned a seat which is either unfilled or filled by a student with a
lower priority. Moreover, violations of stability are rather easily detectable; one does not need
to consider larger groups of students or schools.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. For all three mechanisms Nash equilibrium
and for any quota, Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist. In fact, a straightforward extension
of a result due to Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) says that the Boston mechanisms implements the
set of stable matching, independently of the quota. For the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies was proved by Romero-Medina (1998). For the
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism the proof of existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is
more tortuous. We first show that the Nash equilibrium outcomes do not vary with the quota,
and then invoke the strategy-proofness of the mechanism for the unconstrained case.
Next, given the direct implementation result for the Boston Mechanism we only need to
analyze the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. We
first establish that the associated quota-games have a common feature: the equilibria are nested
with respect to the quota. More precisely, given a quota any Nash equilibrium is also a Nash
equilibrium under any less stringent quota. This leads to the following important observation:
If a Nash equilibrium outcome in a quota-game has an undesirable property then this is not
simply due to the presence of a constraint on the size of submittable lists. The two mechanisms
are different in another aspect: unlike the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, under the Student-
Optimal Stable Mechanism any stable matching can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium,
independently of the quota. Yet, in general, under both mechanisms there are also unstable Nash
equilibrium outcomes. We exhibit a school choice problem with a (strong) Nash equilibrium in
“intuitive” undominated truncations that yields an unstable matching. On the positive side we
identify for each of the two mechanisms a necessary and sufficient condition on the priorities
to guarantee stable Nash equilibrium outcomes. In the case of the Student-Optimal Stable
Mechanism this turns out to be Ergin’s (2002) acyclicity condition. For the Top Trading Cycles
Mechanism the necessary and sufficient condition is Kesten’s (2006a) acyclicity condition. In
other words, the two acyclicity condition are necessary and sufficient conditions on the priority
structure for the implementation of the set of stable matchings in the two direct preference
revelation games.
As a policy implication, our results suggest on the positive side that stability in the restrictive
procedure is obtained through strategic interaction if the assignment of students is based on a
common priority ranking. On the negative side, in view of the implementation result via the
Boston Mechanism and the restrictiveness of both acyclicity conditions, the transition to either
the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is likely to come
with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may occupy more
preferred schools.
4In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they produce stable matchings.
Empirical evidence is given in Roth (1984, 1990, 1991) and Roth and Xing (1994).
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Besides its policy implications, our paper gives additional strength to Ergin’s (2002) and
Kesten’s (2006a) acyclicity conditions. Ergin (2002) showed that his acyclicity condition on the
priority structure is sufficient for Pareto-efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency
of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions
separately. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, the same acyclicity condition also serves to guarantee
the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism.
Kesten (2006a) showed that his acyclicity on the priority structure is sufficient for resource
monotonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as
well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. He also proved that the Top Trading
Cycles Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism if and only if the
priority structure is acyclic. We show that exactly the same condition also guarantees the
stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the model of school
choice. In Section 3 we describe the three mechanisms and provide an illustrative example. In
Section 4, we introduce the strategic game induced by the imposition of a quota on the revealed
preferences. In Sections 5, 6, and 7 we present our results on the existence, nestedness, and
stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes for the quota-game under the Boston, Student-
Optimal Stable, and Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, respectively. In Section 8 we study Nash
equilibria of undominated truncations for the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top
Trading Cycles Mechanism. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss the policy implications of our results
and possible future research directions. All proofs are relegated to the Appendices.
2 School Choice
In a school choice problem (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), there are a number of schools
and a number of students each of which has to be assigned a seat at not more than one of the
schools. Each student is assumed to have strict preferences over his acceptable set of schools.
Each school is endowed with a strict priority ordering of all students and a fixed capacity of
seats that can be filled.
Formally, a school choice problem is a 5-tuple (I, S, q, P, f) that consists of
1. a set of students I = {i1, . . . , in};
2. a set of schools S = {s1, . . . , sm};
3. a capacity vector q = (q1, . . . , qm);
4. a profile of strict student preferences P = (Pi1 , . . . , Pin);
5. a strict priority structure of the schools over the students f = (fs1 , . . . , fsm).
We denote by i and s a generic student and a generic school, respectively. An agent is an
element of V := I ∪ S. A generic agent is denoted by v. With a slight abuse of notation we
write v for singletons {v} ⊆ V .
The preference relation Pi of student i is a linear order over S∪ i, where i denotes the option
of remaining unassigned. Student i is said to prefer school s to school s′ if sPis′. School s is
acceptable to i if sPii. Henceforth, when describing a particular preference relation of a student
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we will only represent acceptable schools. For instance, Pi = s, s′ means that student i’s most
preferred school is s, his second best s′, and any other school is unacceptable. For the sake
of convenience, if all schools are unacceptable for i then we sometimes write Pi = i instead of
Pi = ∅. Let Ri denote the weak preference relation associated with the preference relation Pi.
The priority ordering fs of school s assigns ranks to students according to their priority for
school s. The rank of student i for school s is fs(i). Then, fs(i) < fs(j) means that student
i has higher priority (or lower rank) for school s than student j. For s ∈ S and i ∈ I, we
denote Ufs (i) for the set of students that have higher priority than student i for school s, i.e.,
Ufs (i) = {j ∈ I : fs(j) < fs(i)}.
Throughout the paper we fix the set of students I and the set of schools S. Hence, a school
choice problem is given by a triple (P, f, q), and simply by P when no confusion is possible.
School choice is closely related to the college admissions model (Gale and Shapley ,1962). The
only but key difference between the two models is that in school choice schools are mere “objects”
to be consumed by students, whereas in the college admissions model (or more generally, in two-
sided matching) both sides of the market are agents with preferences over the other side. In
other words, a college admissions problem is given by 1–4 above and 5’ below:
5’. a profile of strict school preferences PS = (Ps1 , . . . , Psm),
where Ps denotes the strict preference relation of school s ∈ S over all students.
Priority orderings in school choice can be reinterpreted as school preferences in the college
admissions model. Therefore, many results or concepts for the college admissions model have
their natural counterpart for school choice.5 In particular, an outcome of a school choice or
college admissions problem is a matching µ : I ∪ S → 2I ∪ S such that for any i ∈ I and any
s ∈ S,
• µ(i) ∈ S ∪ i;
• µ(s) ∈ 2I ;
• µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s);
• |µ(s)| ≤ qs.
For v ∈ V , we call µ(v) agent v’s allotment, respectively. For i ∈ I, if µ(i) = s ∈ S then
student i is said to be assigned a seat at school s under µ. If µ(i) = i then student i is said to
be unassigned under µ. For convenience we often write a matching as a collection of sets. For
instance, µ = {{i1, i2, s1}, {i3}, {i4, s2}} denotes the matching in which students i1 and i2 each
are assigned a seat at school s1, student i3 is unassigned, and student i4 is assigned a seat at
school s2.
A key property of matchings in the two-sided matching literature is stability. Informally, a
matching is stable if there is no blocking pair school-student such that the student prefers to
occupy a seat of the school, and the school reciprocally prefers to let the student occupy a seat
(by possibly dismissing one of its current students). Stability does not lose its importance in the
context of school choice. The reason is that if a matching is not stable then a student can seek
5See, for instance, Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Ehlers and Klaus, 2006a,b; Ergin, 2002; Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006;
Kesten, 2006a,b.
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legal action against the school district authorities for not getting assigned a seat which is either
unfilled or filled by a student with a lower priority. Formally, let P be a school choice problem.
A matching µ is stable if
• it is individually rational, i.e., for all i ∈ I, µ(i)Rii;
• it is non-wasteful (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999), i.e., for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S, sPiµ(i)
implies |µ(s)| = qs;
• there is no justified envy, i.e., for all i, j ∈ I with µ(j) = s ∈ S, sPiµ(i) implies fs(j) <
fs(i).
It will be convenient to denote the set of individually rational matchings by IR(P ), the set of
non-wasteful matchings by NW (P ), and the set of stable matchings by S(P ).
Another desirable property for a matching is Pareto-efficiency. In the context of school choice,
the schools are mere “objects.” Therefore, to determine whether a matching is Pareto-efficient
we should only take into account the students. A matching ν Pareto dominates a matching µ if
all students prefer ν to µ and there is at least one student that strictly prefers ν to µ. Formally,
ν Pareto dominates µ if ν(i)Riµ(i) for all i ∈ I, and ν(i′)Pi′µ(i′) for some i′ ∈ I. A matching is
Pareto-efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching.
A (student assignment) mechanism systematically selects a matching for each school choice
problem. A mechanism is individual rational if it always selects an individually rational match-
ing. Similarly, one can speak of non-wasteful, stable, or Pareto-efficient mechanisms.
A mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting
his preferences. A mechanism is non-bossy (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) if no student
can maintain his allotment and cause a change in the other students’ allotments by reporting
different preferences. Formally, a mechanism ϕ is non-bossy if for all i ∈ I, Qi, Q′i ∈ Q(m), and
Q−i ∈ Q(m)I\i, ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) implies ϕ(Q′i, Q−i) = ϕ(Qi, Q−i).
3 The Competing Mechanisms
In this section we describe the mechanisms that we study in the context of constrained school
choice: the Boston Mechanism, the Gale-Shapley Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism, and the
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. The three mechanisms are direct mechanisms and for any
priority structure and reported students’ preferences they find a matching via the following
algorithms. Let (I, S, q, P, f) be a school choice problem. Set q1s := qs for all s ∈ S. We
sometimes use an additional superindex P and hence write qP,1s , etc. to avoid possible confusion.
The Boston Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i proposes to his most preferred school in Pi (if i finds all schools
unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school s assigns up to q1s seats to its proposers one
at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining students are rejected. Let q2s denote the
number of available seats at school s. If q2s = 0 then school s is removed.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l− 1 proposes to his next preferred school
in Pi (if i finds all remaining schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). School s assigns
up to qls seats to its (new) proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining
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students are rejected. Let qls denote the number of available seats at school s. If q
l
s = 0 then
school s is removed.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected or all schools have been removed. Any remaining
student remains unassigned. Let β(P ) denote the matching. The mechanism β is the Boston
Mechanism.
The Boston Mechanism is individually rational, non-wasteful, and Pareto-efficient. However, it
is not stable nor strategy-proof.
The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i proposes to his most preferred school in Pi (if i finds all schools
unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school s tentatively assigns up to qs seats to its
proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining students are rejected.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to his next preferred
school in Pi (if i finds all remaining schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school
s considers the new proposers and the students that have a (tentative) seat at s. School s
tentatively assigns up to qs seats to these students one at a time following the priority order fs.
Remaining students are rejected.
The algorithm ends when no student is rejected. Each student is assigned to his final tentative
school. Let γI(P ) = γ(P ) denote the matching. The mechanism γ is the Student-Optimal
Stable Mechanism.
The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is a stable mechanism that is Pareto superior to any
other stable matching mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). An additional important property of
the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is that it is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981;
Roth, 1982). Ergin (2002) showed that “weak acyclicity” of the priority structure is sufficient
for Pareto-efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency of the Student-Optimal Stable
Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately.6 Finally, by letting the
schools propose in the DA-algorithm we obtain, from the students’ point of view, the worst
stable matching, the School-Optimal Stable Matching, denoted by γS(P ).7
The Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i points to his most preferred school in Pi (if i finds all schools unacceptable
he points to himself, i.e., he forms a self-cycle). Each school s points to the student that has
the highest priority in fs. There is at least one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a
seat at the school he points to (or to himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned
are removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q1s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is
in a cycle and q1s > 1, then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes q
2
s := q
1
s − 1.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that has not been removed yet points to his most preferred
school in Pi that has not been removed at some step r, r < l, or points to himself if he finds all
6Ergin (2002) used the terminology of cycles and acyclicity. However, since we will need to introduce another
cyclicity concept due to Kesten (2006a) we slightly change the terminology conveniently.
7The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is employed in several real-life two-sided matching markets. For
instance, the National Resident Matching Program, which assigns medical graduates to hospitals in the US,
was redesigned in 1998 and it was decided to switch from the School-Optimal to the Student-Optimal Stable
Mechanism (Roth and Peranson, 1999; Roth, 2002).
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remaining schools unacceptable. Each school s points to the student with the highest priority
in fs among the students that have not been removed at a step r, r < l. There is at least one
cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to himself
if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is in a cycle and
qls = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q
l
s > 1, then the school is not
removed and its capacity becomes ql+1s := q
l
s − 1.
The algorithm stops when all students or all schools have been removed. Any remaining student
is assigned to himself. Let τ(P ) denote the matching. The mechanism τ is the Top Trading
Cycles Mechanism.
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).8
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanism (see
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003, for proofs in the context of school choice). The mechanism
is also individually rational and non-wasteful. Kesten (2006a) showed that “acyclicity” of the
priority structure is sufficient for resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of
the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately.
He also proved that the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal
Stable Mechanism if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.9
We illustrate the working of the three mechanisms in the following example.
Example 3.1 Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools,
and q = (1, 2, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. So, for instance, Pi1 = s2, s1 and fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) <
fs1(i4).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s1 s1 s2 i1 i3 i4
s1 s2 s2 s3 i2 i4 i1
s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
i4 i2 i3
If the students truthfully report their preference lists, then the mechanisms yield the following
matchings.
The Boston Mechanism.
In Step 1 of the Boston Algorithm each student proposes to his most preferred school. So,
school s1 receives a proposal from i2 and i3. Student i2 has a higher priority, so i3’s proposal
is rejected and i1 is assigned the unique seat at s1. School s2 receives a proposal from i1
and i4. Since school s2 has 2 seats each of the students i1 and i4 is assigned a seat at s2.
8The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was inspired by Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Algorithm which was used by
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) to obtain the unique core allocation for housing markets (Shapley and Scarf ,1974).
9A variant of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) for
a model of house allocation with existing tenants. Pa´pai (2000) introduced the class of hierarchical exchange
rules of which the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is a special case. She characterized the class of hierarchical ex-
change rules to be the only mechanisms that are Pareto-efficient, group strategy-proof (i.e., immune to preference
misrepresentations by groups of agents), and reallocation-proof (i.e., immune to manipulations by mispresenting
preferences and swapping the assigned objects ex post by pairs of agents).
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Schools s1 and s2 have filled all their seats and hence are removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
In Step 2 student i3 cannot propose to his next preferred school, s2. Since he finds school s3
unacceptable he is removed and remains unassigned. So, the final matching is given by
β(P ) = {{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism.
In Step 1 of the DA algorithm each student proposes to his most preferred school. So, school
s1 receives a proposal from i2 and i3. Student i2 has a higher priority, so i3’s proposal is rejected.
School s2 receives a proposal from i1 and i4. Since school s2 has 2 seats it does not reject any
of the two students. The tentative matching is {{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
In Step 2 student i3 proposes to school s2. So, now school s2 has two (tentatively) accepted
students, i1 and i4, and one new proposal, from i3. Since school s2 has 2 seats it rejects i1, the stu-
dent with the lowest priority. The tentative matching becomes {{s1, i2}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3}, {i1}} .
In Step 3 student i1 proposes to school s1. The unique seat of school s1 is tentatively
occupied by i2. Since i1 has a higher priority than student i2, the latter is rejected. The
tentative matching becomes {{s1, i1}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3}, {i2}} .
In Step 4 student i2 proposes to school s3. Since school s3’s unique seat is available, student
i2 is accepted. No student has been rejected in this step, so the tentative matching is the final
matching and is given by
γ(P ) = {{s1, i1}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3, i2}} .
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
In Step 1 of the TTC algorithm each student points to his most preferred school, and each
school points to the student with highest priority. There is a unique cycle that is given by
(i1, s2, i3, s1). So, students i1 and i3 are assigned a seat at schools s2 and s1, respectively.
Students i1 and i3 are removed. Since school s1 had only 1 available seat it is also removed.
School s2 still has an available seat and is therefore not removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i3}, {s2, i1}, {s3}, {i2}, {i4}} .
In Step 2 there is a unique cycle given by (i4, s2). So, student i4 is assigned the remaining
seat at school s2. Both student i4 and school s2 are removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i3}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i2}} .
In Step 3 only student i2 and school s3 remain. Since i2 finds school s3 acceptable, he points
to the school. Since i2 is the only remaining student, school s3 points to i2. This creates a cycle
and hence i2 is assigned a seat at school s3. So, the final matching is
τ(P ) = {{s1, i3}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3, i2}} .
Note that for the school choice problem above the three mechanisms generate different match-
ings. Also, the obtained matchings illustrate directly some of the “problems” of the mechanisms.
For instance, β(P ) is Pareto-efficient but not stable because student i3 has justified envy with
respect to school s2 and any of the students that occupy a seat. In fact, one readily sees that
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β is not strategy-proof. (Would student i3 have announced the list that only contains school s2
he would have guaranteed a seat at this school.) Similarly, one easily verifies that γ(P ) is stable
but not Pareto-efficient and that τ(P ) is Pareto-efficient but not stable. More importantly, note
that if in a direct revelation game under γ or τ students could only submit a list of 2 schools,
student i2 would remain unassigned (and the other students unaffected), provided that each
student submits the list with his two most preferred schools. Therefore, if students can only
submit short preference lists, then (at least) student i3 would have to strategize. 
4 Constrained Preference Revelation: the Quota-Game
Fix the priority ordering f and the capacities q. We consider the following school choice pro-
cedure. Students are asked to submit (simultaneously) preference lists Q = (Qi1 , . . . , Qin) of
“length” at most k (i.e., preference lists with at most k acceptable schools). Here, k is a positive
integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and is called the quota. Subsequently, a mechanism ϕ is used to obtain the
matching ϕ(Q) and for all i ∈ I, student i is assigned a seat at school ϕ(Q)(i).
It is clear that the above procedure induces a strategic-form game, the Quota-Game
Γϕ(P, k) = 〈I,Q(k)I , P 〉. The set of players is the set of students I. The strategy set of
each student is the set of preference lists with at most k acceptable schools and is denoted
by Q(k). Let Q = Q(m). Outcomes of the game are evaluated through the true preferences
P = (Pi1 , . . . , Pin), where with some abuse of notation P denotes the straightforward extension
of the preference relation over schools and the null school to matchings. That is, for all i ∈ I
and matchings µ and µ′, µPiµ′ if and only if µ(i)Piµ′(i).
For any profile of preferences Q ∈ QI and any i ∈ I, we write Q−i for the profile of preferences
that is obtained from Q after leaving out preferences Qi of student i. A profile of submitted
preference lists Q ∈ Q(k)I is a Nash equilibrium in the game Γϕ(P, k) (or k-Nash equilibrium
for short) if for all i ∈ I and all Q′i ∈ Q(k), ϕ(Qi, Q−i)Riϕ(Q′i, Q−i). Let Eϕ(P, k) denote
the set of k-Nash equilibria. Let Oϕ(P, k) denote the set of k-Nash equilibrium outcomes, i.e.,
Oϕ(P, k) = {ϕ(Q) : Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k)}.
5 Boston Mechanism
Our first result that will serve as a benchmark for the other two mechanisms states that the
Boston Mechanism implements the set of stable matchings, independently of the quota. This
follows directly from a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1 in Ergin and
So¨nmez (2006).10 Its proof is therefore omitted.
Theorem 5.1 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any school choice problem P , the game Γβ(P, k)
implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
10Kojima (2006) shows that the implementation result of Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) can also be extended to
situations in which schools have more general priority structures.
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6 Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
Our first concern is the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This question is easily
settled in the next proposition. In fact, the next proposition states that any stable matching is
the outcome of some Nash equilibrium, and each outcome of some Nash equilibrium is at least
individually rational and non-wasteful.
Proposition 6.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k, ∅ 6= S(P ) ⊆ Oγ(P, k) ⊆
IR(P ) ∩NW (P ).
We are in position to prove a first important result: the equilibria of the Quota-Games are
nested in the sense that for 1 ≤ k < m any k-Nash equilibrium is also a (k+1)-Nash equilibrium.
In other words, if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for some quota then it is also a Nash
equilibrium for all less stringent quotas. Obviously, this also implies that the sets of Nash
equilibrium outcomes are nested. An important consequence of this result is that violation of
stability in equilibrium is not simply caused by the presence of a quota imposed on the students’
preference lists. Indeed, if for some quota k a Nash equilibrium outcome is unstable then this
unstable matching is also supported at (the same) equilibrium when the quota is set to m (the
number of school) which is equivalent to not imposing any quota.
Proposition 6.2 For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eγ(P, k) ⊆ Eγ(P, k′).
Now we will explore whether the first inclusion of Proposition 6.1 can be reversed. In other
words: is the outcome of each Nash equilibrium in the game Γγ(P, k) free of justified envy with
respect to the true preferences P? We start off with a positive answer for the restrictive case of
k = 1.
Proposition 6.3 For any school choice problem P , S(P ) = Oγ(P, 1).
In Implementation Theory jargon, Proposition 6.3 says that the game Γγ(P, 1) implements the
set of stable matchings for P in Nash equilibria. The following example shows that for any quota
k 6= 1 this is in general not true.
Example 6.4 An Unstable Nash Equilibrium Outcome in Γγ(P,k) for quota k 6= 1
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1) be
the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the
table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2
s2 s1 s1 i1 i3
s1 s2 s2 i2 i1
i3 i2
Using the DA-algorithm one finds γI(P ) = γS(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s2}, {i2}}. Hence, S(P ) =
{γI(P )} consists of the unique stable matching in which i1 and i3 are assigned to s1 and s2,
respectively, and i2 remains unassigned.
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Let k = 2 be the quota. Consider the truth-telling strategy for students i1 and i3, i.e., let
Qi1 = Pi1 and Qi3 = Pi3 , respectively. Regarding student i2, consider his 5 possible strategies
in Q(2) = {Qa, Qb, Qc, Qd, Qe}, where Qa = s1, Qb = s2, Qc = s1, s2, Qd = s2, s1, and Qe = ∅.
One easily verifies that for any profile Q = (Qi1 , Qi2 , Qi3) with Qi2 ∈ Q(2), γ(Q)(i2) = i2.
Now note that for Q∗ := (Qi1 , Qb, Qi3), γ(Q∗) = {{i1, s2}, {i3, s1}, {i2}}. Hence, at γ(Q∗)
students i1 and i3 are assigned to their most preferred school. So, neither i1 nor i3 has a
profitable deviation. Hence, Q∗ ∈ Eγ(P, 2). However, γ(Q∗) = {{i1, s2}, {i3, s1}, {i2}} is not
stable for P . (Student i2 has justified envy for school s1, since γ(Q∗)(i3) = s1, s1Pi2γ(Q∗)(i2),
and fs1(i2) < fs1(i3).)
Note that for k > 2, n > 3, and/or m > 2 one can obtain an unstable k-Nash equilibrium
outcome by making schools s1 and s2 unacceptable in the other students’ preferences and the
other schools unacceptable for students i1, i2, and i3. 
In Example 6.4 student i2 can block a potential settlement between the other two students with-
out affecting his own position: γ(Qi1 , Q
c, Qi3) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s2}, {i2}} but γ(Qi1 , Qe, Qi3) =
{{i1, s2}, {i3, s1}, {i2}}. (This in fact shows that γ is bossy.) Moreover, the restricted capacities
of the schools makes that there is competition for the schools. These are the two ingredients
that generate an unstable Nash equilibrium outcome. In fact, the example exhibits a strongly
cyclic priority structure (Ergin, 2002).
Definition 6.5 Strong Cycles and Weak Acyclicity (Ergin, 2002)
Given a priority structure f , a strong cycle is constituted of distinct s, s′ ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I such
that the following two conditions are satisfied:
cycle condition fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i) and
c-scarcity condition there exist disjoint sets Is, Is′ ⊆ I\{i, j, l} (possibly Is = ∅ or Is′ = ∅) such
that Is ⊆ Ufs (j), Is′ ⊆ Ufs′(i), |Is| = qs − 1, and |Is′ | = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure is weakly acyclic if no strong cycles exist. 4
Ergin (2002) showed that weak acyclicity of the priority structure is sufficient for Pareto-
efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. Our first main result says that weak
acyclicity is also a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee that for any profile of student
preferences all Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable matchings:
Theorem 6.6 Let k 6= 1. Then, f is a weakly acyclic priority structure if and only if for any
school choice problem P , the game Γγ(P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
7 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
For starters, the Nash equilibrium of the Quota-Game induced by the Top Trading Cycles
mechanism are at least individually rational and non-wasteful.
Proposition 7.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oτ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P )∩NW (P ) .
Following the structure of Section 6 and before turning to the implementation of the set of
stable matchings, we first turn to the counterpart of Proposition 6.2. The following definition
introduces a property that guarantees that a mechanism has nested Nash equilibria.
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Definition 7.2 Individually Idempotent Mechanism
Let ϕ be a mechanism. We say that ϕ is individually idempotent if for any Q ∈ QI , any i ∈ I,
Q˜i = ϕ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1) implies ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i) = ϕ(Q). 4
Proposition 7.3 Let ϕ be an individually idempotent mechanism. For any school choice prob-
lem P and quotas k < k′, Eϕ(P, k) ⊆ Eϕ(P, k′).
Lemma 7.4 Mechanism τ is individually idempotent.
Corollary 7.5 For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eτ (P, k) ⊆ Eτ (P, k′).
Note that a result due to Roth (1982) [Lemma A.1 in the Appendix] may suggest that γ is in-
dividually idempotent: for any Q ∈ QI , any i ∈ I, Q˜i = γ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1) implies γ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) =
γ(Q)(i). However, in Example 6.4 we have γ(Qi1 , Q
c, Qi3) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s2}, {i2}} but
γ(Qi1 , Q
e, Qi3) = {{i1, s2}, {i3, s1}, {i2}}, which shows that γ is not individually idempotent.
The next proposition reverses in a certain way Corollary 7.5: any matching that is sustained
at some Nash equilibrium for a particular quota can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium for
a more stringent quota.
Proposition 7.6 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oτ (P, k) = Oτ (P, 1) 6= ∅.
Given the result above, the next two examples show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is
not a subset nor a superset of the set of stable matchings. In fact, Example 7.8 shows that the
set of stable matchings and the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes can be disjoint sets.
Example 7.7 Oτ (P, 1) * S(P )
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1)
be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given in
the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s1 s2 i3 i2 i3
s2 s2 s1 i1 i1 i1
s3 s3 s3 i2 i3 i2
Let k = 1 be the quota. Consider the profile Q = (s3, s1, s2) ∈ Q(1)I . Clearly, τ(Q) =
{{i1, s3}, {i2, s1}, {i3, s2}}. Notice that students i2 and i3 obtain their most preferred school, so
student i is the only possible student that may profitably deviate.
For any strategy student i1 may choose, observe that the cycle (s1, i3, s2, i2, s1) forms in
the first step of the execution of the TTC algorithm. It follows that for any Q̂i1 ∈ Q(1),
τ(Q̂i1 , Q−i1)(i1) is either i1 or school s3. Hence, Q ∈ Eτ (P, 1).
Yet, τ(Q) is not stable: student i1 has a higher priority than student i2 for school s1 =
τ(Q)(i2) and student i1 prefers school s1 to s3, his matching under τ(Q). 
Example 7.8 S(P ) * Oτ (P, 1)
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1) be
the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the
table below.
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Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2
s1 s1 s2 i1 i3
i2 i2
i3 i1
It is easy to check that the unique stable matching is µ = {{i1}, {i2, s1}, {i3, s2}}. We show that
µ cannot be sustained at any Nash equilibrium of the game Γτ (P, 1). Suppose to the contrary
that µ can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium. In other words, there is a profile Q ∈ Q(1)I
such that τ(Q) = µ and Q ∈ Eτ (P, 1). Since τ(Q) = µ, Qi2 = s1 and Qi3 = s2. If Qi1 = s1,
then τ(Q)(i1) = s1 6= µ(i1). If Qi1 = s2, then τ(Q)(i1) = s2 6= µ(i1). So, Qi1 = i1. However,
it is clear that student i1 is strictly better off by reporting Q′i1 = s1. Hence, Q 6∈ Eτ (P, 1), a
contradiction. 
Next, we show that Kesten’s (2006a) acyclicity condition is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to implement the set of stable matchings in Nash
equilibria.
Definition 7.9 Cycles and Acyclicity (Kesten, 2006a)
Given a priority structure f , a cycle is constituted of distinct s, s′ ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I such that
the following two conditions are satisfied:
cycle condition fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i), fs′(j) and
c-scarcity condition there exists a (possibly empty) set Is ⊆ I\{i, j, l} with Is ⊆ Ufs (i) ∪
(Ufs (j)\Ufs′(l)) and |Is| = qs − 1.
A priority structure is acyclic if no cycles exist. 4
Kesten (2006a) showed that acyclicity of the priority structure is sufficient for resource mono-
tonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as well as
necessary for each of these conditions separately. He also proved that the Top Trading Cycles
Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism if and only if the priority
structure is acyclic. The latter result and Proposition 7.6 together with our first main result
(Theorem 6.6) are the driving force behind our second main result:
Theorem 7.10 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, f is an acyclic priority structure if and only if for any
school choice problem P , the game Γτ (P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
8 Equilibria of Truncations
In this section we first strengthen Theorems 6.6 and 7.10 by exhibiting a school choice problem
with a (strong) Nash equilibrium in “intuitive” undominated strategies that yields an unstable
matching. Next, we will show that in general there is also no relation between the set of
unassigned students at equilibrium and the set of unassigned students in stable matchings.
However, for Nash equilibria in “intuitive” undominated strategies we do obtain positive results
in this respect.
One piece of advise about which preference list a student should submit follows from the
strategy-proofness of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism γ in the unrestricted case: it does
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not pay off to submit a list of schools that does not respect the true order. More precisely, a list
that does not respect the order of a student’s true preferences is weakly dominated by listing the
same schools in the “true order.” Let ϕ be a mechanism. Student i’s strategy Qi ∈ Q(k) in the
game Γϕ(P, k) is weakly k-dominated by another strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k) if ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)
for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i.
Lemma 8.1 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student. Consider
two strategies Qi, Q′i ∈ Q(k) such that (a) Qi and Q′i contain the same set of schools, and (b) for
any two schools s and s′ listed in Qi (or Q′i), sQ
′
is
′ ⇒ sPis′. Then, Qi is weakly k-dominated
by Q′i in the games Γ
γ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k).
The message of Lemma 8.1 is clear: a student cannot lose (and may possibly gain) by submitting
the same set of schools in the true order. A special type of strategies that satisfy this condition
are the so-called truncations. A truncation of a preference list is a list obtained from the
preference list by deleting some specific school and all less preferred acceptable schools. Formally,
a truncation of a preference list Pi is a list P ′i such that the schools in P
′
i are contained in Pi
and sP ′is
′ implies sPis′. The following lemma says that in the games Γγ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k)
submitting a truncation “as long as possible” is k-undominated. Formally, student i’s strategy
Qi ∈ Q(k) is k-dominated by another strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k) if ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i) for all
Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i and ϕ(Q′i, Q′−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q′−i) for some Q′−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. A strategy in Q(k) is
k-undominated if it is not k-dominated by any other strategy in Q(k).
Lemma 8.2 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student. Denote
the number of (acceptable) schools in Pi by |Pi|. Then, the strategy P ki of submitting the first
min{k, |Pi|} schools of the true preference list Pi in the true order is k-undominated in the games
Γγ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k).
Although the strategy profile P k is a profile of k-undominated strategies, it is not necessarily a
Nash equilibrium in the game Γϕ(P, k). In case it is a Nash equilibrium it may still induce an
unstable matching as the following example shows. This clearly strengthens Examples 6.4 and 7.7
in the sense that it shows that unstability is not simply due to the choice of a pathological
equilibrium.
Example 8.3 For both γ and τ : Strong Nash Equilibrium in (Undominated) Trun-
cations yields Unstable Matching.
Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1, 1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f
are given in the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s2 s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
s2 s3 s1 s2 i1 i2 i4
s3 s1 s2 s3 i2 i3 i3
i4 i4 i1
Let ϕ = γ, τ . Let k = 2 be the quota. Consider the strategy profile Q = P 2 ∈ Q(2)I of
2-undominated truncations:
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Qi1 Qi2 Qi3 Qi4
s1 s2 s3 s1
s2 s3 s1 s2
One easily verifies that ϕ(Q) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s2}, {i3, s3}, {i4}}. Since student i4 has justified
envy for school s3, ϕ(Q) 6∈ S(P ). It remains to show that Q is a strong Nash equilibrium (cf.
Aumann, 1959) in Γϕ(P, 2). Since students i1, i2, and i3 are assigned a seat at their favorite
school, it is sufficient to check that student i4 has no profitable deviation. Notice that the only
possibility for student i4 to change the outcome of the mechanism is by listing school s3. So, the
only strategies that we have to check are given by Q¯(2) = {Qa, Qb, Qc, Qd, Qe}, where Qa = s3,
Qb = s1, s3, Qc = s2, s3, Qd = s3, s1, and Qe = s3, s2. By Lemma 8.1, Qd and Qe are weakly
2-dominated by Qb and Qc, respectively. So in fact we only have to consider strategies Qa, Qb,
and Qc. Given the other students’ strategies Q−i4 and the priority orderings of s1 and s2, for
any of these three strategies for student i4, in the DA-algorithm i4 is never tentatively assigned
to s1 or s2. Hence, γ(Qa, Q−i4)(i4) = γ(Qb, Q−i4)(i4) = γ(Qc, Q−i4)(i4). Routine computations
show that γ(Qa, Q−i4)(i4) = i4. One easily checks that τ(Qa, Q−i4)(i4) = τ(Qb, Q−i4)(i4) =
τ(Qc, Q−i4)(i4) = i4 since student i4 cannot break the cycle (i1, s1, i3, s3, i2, s2) that forms in
the first step of the TTC-algorithm. Hence, student i4 does not have a profitable deviation for
either γ or τ . 
A straightforward translation of the results of McVitie and Wilson (1970) and Roth (1984)
from college admissions to school choice gives that for any school choice problem, the set of
unassigned students is the same for all stable matchings.11 In other words, for µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ),
µ(i) = i implies µ′(i) = i. Given the restrictiveness of the acyclicity condition to guarantee
stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, one may wonder whether at least always the set of unassigned
students at equilibrium coincides with the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. In fact,
a less ambitious idea would be to establish that at equilibrium the number of unassigned students
equals the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. The following two examples show
that in general this is not true. In other words, the number of unassigned students at equilibrium
differs from the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. Given the first inclusion in
Proposition 6.1, this in particular implies for the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism that the
number of unassigned students can vary from one equilibrium outcome to another.
Example 8.4 For both γ and τ : Less Assigned Students at Equilibrium than in Stable
Matchings
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1)
be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given in
the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s3 s1 s2 i1 i3 i2
s2 s1 i2 i1 i3
11A generalization of this result is known in the two-sided matching literature as the “Rural Hospital Theorem”
(Roth, 1986) and says that the degree of occupation and quality of interns at typically less demanded rural
hospitals in the US is not due to the choice of a specific stable matching.
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One easily verifies that strategy profile Q given below is a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P, 2) and
Γτ (P, 2).
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3
s1 s1 s3
s3 s1
Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s3}, {i2}, {s2}} and γ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s2}}, there
are less assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. 
Example 8.5 For both γ and τ : More Assigned Students at Equilibrium than in
Stable Matchings.
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1)
be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given in
the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s2 s2 i1 i3 i2
s1 s1 i2 i1 i3
One easily verifies that strategy profile Q given below is a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P, 2) and
Γτ (P, 2).
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3
s2 s3 s1
s3 s2 s2
Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1, s2}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s1}} and γ(P ) = {{i2, s3}, {i3, s2}, {i1}, {s1}}, there
are more assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. 
We obtain a positive result for γ if we restrict ourselves to equilibria in truncations. More
precisely, the following proposition says that if a profile of truncations is a Nash equilibrium
in the game Γγ(P, k) then the set of assigned students at the equilibrium coincides with the
set of assigned students at any stable matching. In fact, each Nash equilibrium in truncations
in the game Γγ(P, k) yields a matching that is either the Student-Optimal matching γ(P ) or
Pareto dominates γ(P ). For a matching µ, denote M(µ) for the set of assigned students, i.e.,
M(µ) = {i ∈ I : µ(i) 6= i}.
Proposition 8.6 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If the profile of truncations
P k := (P ki )i∈I is a Nash equilibrium in Γ
γ(P, k), then γ(P k)(i)Riγ(P )(i) for all i ∈ M(γ(P )).
Hence, M(γ(P k)) =M(γ(P )).
For τ we cannot obtain a similar result as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 8.7 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If the profile of truncations
P k := (P ki )i∈I is a Nash equilibrium in Γ
τ (P, k), then possibly |M(τ(P k))| > |M(γ(P ))| or
|M(τ(P k))| < |M(γ(P ))|.
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9 Discussion
In this section we first summarize our main findings. Next, we discuss their policy implications
and our contribution to the literature on school choice. Finally, we conclude with some extensions
of our results and possible directions for future research.
We have analyzed three prominent mechanisms to assign children to public schools on the
basis of priority rankings. The main feature of our analysis is that the assignment procedure
impedes students to fully reveal their true preferences. The Boston Mechanism, which in several
school districts in the US is on the verge of being replaced by either one of (the other) two
mechanisms proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), is robust in the sense that stability
is guaranteed in equilibrium, no matter the imposed quota on the length of the submittable
preference lists. The other two mechanisms, which have desirable properties in the unconstrained
case, do not perform as well. In the first place, we show that both mechanisms allow for
equilibria in undominated strategies that induce unstable outcomes. In the second place, we
identify two acyclicity conditions on the priority structure that are necessary and sufficient for
the implementation of the set of stable matchings.
To fully understand the policy implications of our results, we first note that both acyclicity
conditions are quite restrictive.12 Stability of the equilibrium outcomes, though, is assured for
both the Student-Optimal Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism if the assignment
of students is based on a common priority ranking. In practice, however, multiple exogenous
criteria are employed: geographic distance, social origin, the number of siblings attending the
same school, etc. Hence, the transition of the Boston Mechanism to either of the two mechanisms
is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may
occupy more preferred schools. Therefore, for policy makers opting for this transition possible
efficiency gains (Chen and So¨nmez, 2006 and Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006) should outweigh an
increasing risk of violations of stability. Clearly, if the quota of the assignment procedure is not
very restrictive (relative to the number of schools and seats), then most students can submit a
truncation of their true preferences. In that case, the likelihood of problems due to unstability
may remain small.
Apart from the policy implications of our results and providing an additional dimension to
the acyclicity conditions due to Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006a), we also contribute to the
theory of implementation in matching markets. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper
provides the first complete analysis of the equilibria in the preference revelation game induced
by the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. All previ-
ous studies, except Romero-Medina (1998), assumed preference revelation to be unconstrained.
Given the strategy-proofness of both mechanisms in the unconstrained case, an analysis of all
(other) equilibria was therefore in some sense not necessary. It is well-known that in the context
of two-sided matching, preference revelation induced by stable mechanism may have unstable
equilibrium outcomes (Alcalde, 1996 and So¨nmez, 1997).13 In the context of school choice, where
only one side of the market is strategic, Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) showed that the negative re-
sult above can be avoided by using the Boston Mechanism. We show that in this sense also the
12See Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006a) for further illustration and discussion.
13Other recent papers on implementation in a various of settings of two-sided matching include Alcalde and
Romero-Medina (2000), Kara and So¨nmez (1996,1997), Ma (1995), Peleg (1997), Shin and Suh (1996), Shinotsuka
and Takamiya (2003), Sotomayor (2003), Suh (2003), Tadenuma and Toda (1998).
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Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism can be employed,
as long as the priority structure is acyclic.
We have analyzed three prominent student assignment mechanisms that are used or at the
point of being adopted in several school districts in the US. As was pointed out by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles
Mechanism have desirable properties (at least in the unconstrained case). Still, one could con-
sider alternative mechanisms. An obvious candidate is the School-Optimal Stable Mechanism
γS . Theorems 3 and 4 in Sotomayor (1996) imply the implementation of the stable set via γS
in Nash equilibria in the context of unconstrained school choice. A proof of the same result
in the context of constrained school choice can be obtained by a straightforward adaptation of
the proofs. Alternatively, one can adapt the proofs of Theorems 4.15 and 4.16 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), which were originally proven in Gale and Sotomayor (1985a, Theorem 2) and
Roth (1984).14 In spite of this positive implementation result, one should be aware that from
the students’ point of view the outcomes of the School-Optimal Stable Mechanism are worse
than those of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism. Again in the context of unconstrained
school choice, Ergin and So¨nmez (2006, Theorem 4) extended their implementation result of the
Boston Mechanism to the class of so-called monotonic priority mechanisms. One can verify that
this result can be further generalized to the case of constrained school choice. Finally, our results
also hold in the model where policy makers can impose different quotas on different students.
Throughout our analysis we have assumed a complete information environment. Ergin and
So¨nmez (2006, Example 4) showed that the results for the Boston Mechanism do not carry
over to incomplete information environments. Therefore, an important direction for future
research would be to determine to what extent the predictions and results under the complete
information assumption are robust to changes in the level of information. Analysis of field data
and experimental studies may be very helpful.
A Appendix: Proofs Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1:
By Gale and Shapley (1962), S(P ) 6= ∅. We now prove that S(P ) ⊆ Oγ(P, k). Let µ ∈ S(P ).
Define Qi = µ(i) ∈ Q(k) for all i ∈ I. Since in the first step of the DA-algorithm for Q no student
is rejected, γ(Q) = µ. It remains to prove that Q is a Nash equilibrium in the Quota-Game
Γγ(P, k). Suppose to the contrary thatQ /∈ Eγ(P, k). Then there exists a student i and a strategy
Q′i ∈ Q(k) such that γ(Q′i, Q−i)Pγ(Q) = µ. Since γ(Q) = µ ∈ S(P ), γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). Hence,
γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) ∈ S. Denote s = γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i). Note i 6∈ µ(s). Consider the DA-algorithm for
(Q′i, Q−i). Of the students in I\i, only the students in µ(s) make their unique proposal to s; all
other students make either a unique proposal to another school or make no proposal at all. Since
γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s, it follows that student i starts making proposals but gets rejected until he
proposes to s and get assigned a seat at s (now the DA-algorithm ends since no new proposals are
made). Since under (Q′i, Q−i) school s accepts i it must be that |µ(s)| < qs or there is a student
j ∈ µ(s) with fs(j) > fs(i). In the first case, µ is wasteful for P , contradicting µ ∈ S(P ). In the
14A noticeable exception to the use of quotas in school choice is the assignment of students to secondary schools
in Singapore where students have to submit a list that contains all schools. Teo et al. (2001) show that even for
the school-optimal stable mechanism this leaves little room for profitable manipulation.
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second case, µ is not stable for P (student i has justified envy), also contradicting µ ∈ S(P ).
So, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k).
Next, we prove that Oγ(P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) ∩ NW (P ). Let Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). It is immediate that
γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). We prove that γ(Q) ∈ NW (P ). Suppose to the contrary that γ(Q) 6∈ NW (P ).
Then, there is a student i ∈ I and a school s ∈ S with sPiγ(i) and |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. Let Q¯i
be the empty list. Let Q¯ = (Q¯i, Q−i). By a result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985, Theorem 2)
extended to the college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 5.34), for each
j ∈ I\i, either γ(Q¯)(j) = γ(Q)(j) or γ(Q¯)(j)Qjγ(Q)(j). Hence, the set of schools to which each
j ∈ I\i proposes in DA(Q¯) is a subset of the schools to which he proposes in DA(Q). Since
moreover Q¯i is the empty list, each school receives in DA(Q¯) only a subset of the proposals of
DA(Q). For school s this immediately implies that |γ(Q¯)(s)| ≤ |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. So, if we take
Q′i = s then γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = sPγ(Q), i.e., Q
′
i is a profitable deviation for i at Q in Γ
γ(P, k). So,
Q 6∈ Eγ(P, k), a contradiction. Hence, γ(Q) ∈ NW (P ). 2
We will make use of the following result from two-sided matching to prove Proposition 6.2.
Lemma A.1 (Roth, 1982, Lemma 1; cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Lemma 4.8)
Let P and P ′ be two school choice problems. Let i ∈ I. Suppose Pl = P ′l for all l ∈ I\i. Suppose
P ′i is a preference list whose first choice is γ(P )(i) if γ(P )(i) 6= i, and the empty list otherwise.
Then, γ(P ′)(i) = γ(P )(i).
Proof of Proposition 6.2:
It suffices to prove the proposition for k′ = k + 1. Let Q ∈ Eγ(P, k) and suppose that
Q /∈ Eγ(P, k + 1). Hence, there is a student i and a strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k + 1) such
that γ(Q′i, Q−i)Piγ(Qi, Q−i). By individual rationality of γ(Q) for P (Proposition 6.1),
γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) ∈ S. Note also that Q′i must be a list containing exactly k + 1 schools, for
otherwise it would also be a profitable deviation in Γγ(P, k), contradicting Q ∈ Eγ(P, k).
Let s be the last school listed in Q′i. We claim that γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = s. Suppose not.
Consider the truncation of Q′i after γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) and denote this list by Q
′′
i . In other words,
Q′′i is the list obtained from Q
′
i by making all schools listed after γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) unacceptable.
Note that Q′′i is a list with at most k schools, i.e., Q
′′
i ∈ Q(k). It follows from the DA-algorithm
that γ(Q′′i , Q−i) = γ(Q
′
i, Q−i). Hence, Q
′′
i is a profitable deviation for i at Q in Γ
γ(P, k), a
contradiction. So, γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s.
From Lemma A.1, it follows that with Q̂i = s we have γ(Q̂i, Q−i)(i) = s. Finally, observe
that Q̂i ∈ Q(k). Hence, Q̂i is a profitable deviation for i at Q in Γγ(P, k), a contradiction.
Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k + 1). 2
Proof of Proposition 6.3:
The inclusion S(P ) ⊆ Oγ(P, 1) follows from Proposition 6.1. We prove Oγ(P, 1) ⊆ S(P ).
Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ Eγ(P, 1) but γ(Q) /∈ S(P ). From Proposition 6.1 it follows
that at γ(Q) some student has justified envy. So, there are two students i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, with
γ(Q)(j) = s ∈ S, sPiγ(Q)(i), and fs(i) < fs(j). Now consider the strategy Q′i = s. Since
(Q′i, Q−i) ∈ Q(1)I , γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s, i.e., Q′i is a profitable deviation for student i at Q in
Γγ(P, 1). Hence, Q /∈ Eγ(P, 1), a contradiction. So, Oγ(P, 1) ⊆ S(P ). 2
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Lemma A.2 Let f be a strongly cyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there is a
school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γγ(P, k), i.e., for
some Q ∈ Eγ(P, k), γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ).
Proof: Since f is strongly cyclic, we may assume, without loss of generality, that students
{i1, i2, i3} and schools {s1, s2} constitute a strong cycle. In fact, we may assume, without loss
of generality, that
(a) fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) and fs2(i3) < fs2(i1),
(b) for j ∈ {4, qs1 + 3}, fs1(ij) < fs1(i2), and
(c) for j ∈ {qs1 + 4, qs1 + qs2 + 2}, fs2(ij) < fs2(i1).
Consider the students’ preferences P given below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 · · · Piqs1+3 Piqs1+4 · · · Piqs1+qs2+2 Piqs1+qs2+3 · · · Pin
s2 s1 s1 s1 s1 s1 s2 s2 s2
s1 s2
Unacceptable schools are not depicted.
There are three possibilities for the priority ordering fs2 of school s2:
(i) fs2(i2) < fs2(i3) < fs2(i1),
(ii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i2) < fs2(i1), or
(iii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i1) < fs2(i2).
We apply the DA-algorithm (with students proposing) to P . First note that by the construction
of P and (b) and (c), all students in {i4, iqs1+qs2+1} are assured (and in fact are assigned) a
seat at their most preferred school. Since for each j ∈ {qs1 + qs2 + 2, . . . , n}, student ij finds
all schools unacceptable, one seat of each of the schools s1 and s2 remains to be assigned to the
students in {i1, i2, i3}. One easily verifies that the DA-algorithm in each of the three cases (i),
(ii), and (iii), assigns students i1 and i3 to schools s1 and s2, respectively. We obtain the same
matching if we apply the DA-algorithm to P with schools proposing. Hence, there is a unique
stable matching µ∗ = µI [P ] = µS [P ] for P in which students i1 and i3 are assigned to schools
s1 and s2, respectively (and student i2 remains unassigned).
Consider the strategy profile Q ∈ Q(k)I given below. We will show that γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ) and
Q ∈ Eγ(P, k).
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3 Qi4 · · · Qiqs1+2 Qiqs1+3 · · · Qiqs1+qs2+2 Qiqs1+qs2+3 · · · Qin
s2 s1 s1 s1 s1 s2 s2 s2
s1 s2
We apply the DA-algorithm (with students proposing) to Q. Similarly as for P , all students
in {i4, iqs1+qs2+2} are assigned a seat at their most preferred school. One seat of each of the
schools s1 and s2 remains to be assigned to the students in {i1, i2, i3}. Since Qi2 is the empty
list, and students i1 and i3 have different favorite schools at Q, the DA-algorithm assigns in
each of the three cases (i), (ii), and (iii), students i1 and i3 to schools s2 and s1, respectively.
So, γ(Q) 6= µ∗. Since S(P ) = {µ∗}, γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ).
Finally, we check that Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). Note that at γ(Q) each of the students i1 and i3 is
assigned a seat at his/her favorite school. So, nor student i1 nor i3 has a profitable deviation
from his/her strategy Qi1 and Qi3 , respectively. It is easy to check that in any of the cases (i),
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(ii), and (iii), and for any strategy Q′i2 ∈ Q(k), γ(Q)Ri2γ(Qi1 , Q′i2 , Qi3). In other words, student
i2 does not have a profitable deviation from Qi2 . Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). 2
Lemma A.3 Let f be a weakly acyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any
school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γγ(P, k) are stable, i.e., for all
Q ∈ Eγ(P, k), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ).
Before we can prove Lemma A.3 we need to recall a result on the Student-Optimal Stable
Mechanism.
Lemma A.4 (Ergin, 2002, Theorem 1, (iv)→ (iii) and proof of (iii)→ (ii))
Let f be a weakly acyclic priority structure. Then, the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism γ is
non-bossy.
Proof of Lemma A.3:
Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ Eγ(P, k) but γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ). By Proposition 6.1, γ(Q) 6∈
F (P, k). So, there are two students i, j ∈ I, i 6= j and a school s ∈ S such that γ(Q)(j) = s,
sPiγ(Q)(i), and fs(i) < fs(j).
Since γ is strategy-proof when there are no restrictions on the length of the (revealed)
preference lists (i.e., when the quota equals m, the number of schools), γ(Pi, Q−i)Riγ(Qi, Q−i).
Let P ′i = γ(P )(i). Clearly, P
′
i ∈ Q(1) ⊆ Q(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(P ′i , Q−i)(i) = γ(Pi, Q−i)(i).
Hence, γ(P ′i , Q−i)Riγ(Qi, Q−i). If γ(P
′
i , Q−i)Piγ(Qi, Q−i), then Q 6∈ Eγ(P, k), a contradiction.
Hence, γ(P ′i , Q−i)(i) = γ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
By Lemma A.4, γ is non-bossy. Hence, γ(Pi, Q−i) = γ(P ′i , Q−i) = γ(Q). In particular,
γ(Pi, Q−i)(j) = γ(Q)(j) = s. Since sPiγ(Q)(i) = γ(Pi, Q−i)(i), student i has justified envy at
γ(Pi, Q−i), contradicting γ(Pi, Q−i) ∈ S(Pi, Q−i). Hence, γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). 2
Proof of Theorem 6.6:
Follows immediately from Proposition 6.1 and Lemmas A.2 and A.3. 2
B Appendix: Proofs Section 7
The following observation on the Top Trading Cycles algorithm is key for the results in Section 7.
Observation B.1 In the TTC algorithm, once a student points to a school it will keep on
pointing to the school in subsequent steps until he is assigned to a seat at the school or until
the school has no longer available seats. Similarly, once a school points to a student it will keep
on pointing to the student in subsequent steps until the student is assigned to a seat at this or
some other school.
Next, we introduce the following graph-theoretic notation to provide concise proofs of our
results. Let Q ∈ QI . Suppose the TTC algorithm is applied to Q and suppose it terminates
in no less than l steps. We denote by Gτ (Q, l) the (directed) graph that corresponds to step
l. In this graph, the set of vertices V τ (Q, l) is the set of agents present in step l. For any
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v ∈ V τ (Q, l) there is a (unique) directed edge in Gτ (Q, l) from v to some v′ ∈ V τ (Q, l) (possibly
v′ = v if v ∈ I) if agent v points to agent v′, which will also be denoted by e(Q, l, v) = v′. By
the TTC algorithm, for any student i ∈ V τ (Q, l) ∩ I, if i points to v′, then Qi ranks v′ higher
than any other agent in (V τ (Q, l)∩ S)∪ i. Similarly, for any school s ∈ V τ (Q, l)∩ S, if s points
to student i, then i has a higher priority for s than any other student in V τ (Q, l) ∩ I. A path
(from v1 to vp) in Gτ (Q, l) is an ordered list of agents (v1, v2, . . . , vp) such that vr ∈ V τ (Q, l) for
all r = 1, . . . , p and each vr points to vr+1 for all r = 1, . . . , p − 1. A self-cycle (i) of a student
i is a degenerate path: i points to himself in Gτ (Q, l). An agent v′ ∈ V τ (Q, l) is a follower of
an agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) if there is a path from v to v′ in Gτ (Q, l). The set of followers of v is
denoted by F τ (Q, l, v). An agent v′ ∈ V τ (Q, l) is a predecessor of an agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) if there
is a path from v′ to v in Gτ (Q, l). The set of predecessors of v is denoted by P τ (Q, l, v). A
cycle in Gτ (Q, l) is a path (v1, v2, . . . , vp) such that also vp points to v1. Note that a self-cycle
is a special case of a cycle. With a slight abuse of notation we sometimes refer to a cycle as the
corresponding non ordered set of involved agents. Finally, for v ∈ I ∪ S, let στ (Q, v) denote the
step of the TTC algorithm at which agent v is removed.
For the sake of convenience, we relegate the proof of Proposition 7.1. For the moment we
only need and state the following lemma.
Lemma B.2 Let P be a school choice problem. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ m, Oτ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) .
Proof of Proposition 7.3:
Let Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k). Suppose Q /∈ Eϕ(P, k′). Then there exists a student, say i, and a list
Q′i ∈ Q(k′) such that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i). Let Q˜′i = ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i). Clearly, Q˜′i ∈ Q(1) ⊆
Q(k). Since ϕ is individually idempotent, ϕ(Q˜′i, Q−i) = ϕ(Q′i, Q−i). So, ϕ(Q˜′i, Q−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i),
contradicting Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k). Hence, Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k′). 2
To prove Lemma 7.4 we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.3 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q˜i ∈ Q. Suppose that τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q˜)(i). Let p
and p˜ be the steps at which student i is assigned in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q˜), respectively. Let
r = min{p, p˜}. Then, at steps g = 1, . . . , r − 1,
(a) at steps 1, . . . , r − 1, the same cycles form in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q˜);
(b) i ∈ V τ (Q, r) = V τ (Q˜, r) and for each school s ∈ V τ (Q, r) ∩ S, qQ,rs = qQ˜,rs ;
(c) e(Q, r, v) = e(Q˜, r, v) for each agent v ∈ V τ (Q, r), v 6= i;
(d) there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either Gτ (Q, r) or Gτ (Q˜, r) (but not both).
Proof: Item (a) follows from the proof of a result in Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999,
Lemma 1) or Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003, Lemma). As for Item (b), from the defini-
tion of r, i ∈ V τ (Q, r) ∩ V τ (Q˜, r). The remainder of Item (b) follows directly from Item (a).
Item (c) follows from Items (a), (b), and the fact that Q˜j = Qj for all students j ∈ I\i. By
definition of r, there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in Gτ (Q, r) or Gτ (Q˜, r). By the assumption that
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τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q˜)(i), e(Q, r, i) 6= e(Q˜, r, i). In particular, C is not a cycle in both Gτ (Q, r) and
Gτ (Q˜, r). This proves Item (d). 2
Proof of Lemma 7.4:
LetQ ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and define Q˜i = τ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1). We have to show that τ(Q˜i, Q−i) = τ(Q).
By non-bossiness of τ , it is sufficient to show that τ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) = τ(Q)(i). If τ(Q)(i) = i, then
from the definition of the TTC algorithm τ(Q˜)(i) = i = τ(Q)(i).
So, suppose τ(Q)(i) = s∗ ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that τ(Q˜)(i) 6= τ(Q)(i). Then, since
Q˜i = τ(Q)(i) = s∗, student i remains unassigned under Q˜, i.e., τ(Q˜)(i) = i. Let p and p˜ be the
steps at which student i is assigned in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q˜), respectively. Let r = min{p, p˜}.
By Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either Gτ (Q, r) or Gτ (Q˜, r) (but not both).
Case 1: Cycle C is in Gτ (Q, r) but not in Gτ (Q˜, r).
Since student i is assigned through cycle C and τ(Q)(i) = s∗, e(Q, r, i) = s∗. Since e(Q˜, r, i) 6=
e(Q, r, i) and Q˜i = τ(Q)(i) = s∗, e(Q˜, r, i) = i. Hence, at the beginning of step r of TTC(Q˜),
school s∗ has no available seats, i.e., qQ˜,rs∗ = 0. By Lemma B.3(b), q
Q,r
s∗ = q
Q˜,r
s∗ = 0. So,
e(Q, r, i) 6= s∗, a contradiction.
Case 2: Cycle C is in Gτ (Q˜, r) but not in Gτ (Q, r).
If e(Q˜, r, i) = s∗, then τ(Q˜)(i) = s∗, a contradiction with τ(Q˜)(i) 6= τ(Q)(i). So by Q˜i =
τ(Q)(i) = s∗, e(Q˜, r, i) = i, i.e., C = (i) is a self-cycle. Since i ∈ V τ (Q, r) and τ(Q)(i) = s∗,
qQ,rs∗ > 0. By Lemma B.3(b), q
Q˜,r
s∗ = q
Q,r
s∗ > 0. But then by Q˜i = τ(Q)(i) = s
∗, e(Q˜, r, i) 6= i, a
contradiction.
Since both Case 1 and Case 2 yield a contradiction, we conclude τ(Q˜)(i) = τ(Q)(i). 2
We need Lemmas B.4–B.7 to prove Proposition 7.6.
Lemma B.4 Let Q¯ ∈ QI . Let v, v′ ∈ I ∪S, v 6= v′. Suppose at some step of the TTC algorithm
applied to Q¯ there is a path from v′ to v. Then, στ (Q¯, v) ≤ στ (Q¯, v′) and [στ (Q¯, v) = στ (Q¯, v′)
only if v and v′ are removed in the same cycle].
Proof: By Observation B.1, each agent in the path from v′ to v will keep on pointing to the
same agent at least until the step in which agent v is removed, i.e., step στ (Q¯, v). Hence,
στ (Q¯, v) ≤ στ (Q¯, v′). Suppose στ (Q¯, v) = στ (Q¯, v′). In other words, agent v′ is removed at the
same step as agent v. Then, all agents in the path from v′ to v form part of a cycle at this step.
In particular, v and v′ are removed in the same cycle. 2
Lemma B.5 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q′i ∈ Q. Suppose τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i) and στ (Q, i) ≤
στ (Q′, i). For each step l, στ (Q, i) ≤ l ≤ στ (Q′, i), if v ∈ V τ (Q′, l)\(P τ (Q′, l, i) ∪ i), then
v ∈ V τ (Q, l) and F τ (Q, l, v) = F τ (Q′, l, v).
Proof: Let p = στ (Q, i) and r′ = στ (Q′, i). From Lemma B.3(b), V τ (Q, p) = V τ (Q′, p) and
qQ,ps = q
Q′,p
s for each school s ∈ V τ (Q, p) ∩ S. (1)
With a slight abuse of notation, for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r′, denote Pl = P τ (Q′, l, i) ∪ i. From
Observation B.1,
Pp ⊆ Pp+1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Pr′−1 ⊆ Pr′ . (2)
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Also note
V τ (Q′, r′) ⊆ V τ (Q′, r′ − 1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ V τ (Q′, p+ 1) ⊆ V τ (Q′, p). (3)
We are done if we prove the following Claim(l) for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r′.
Claim(l): If v ∈ V τ (Q′, l)\Pl, then v ∈ V τ (Q, l) and e(Q, l, v) = e(Q′, l, v).
Indeed Claim (l) immediately implies the following Consequence(l):
Consequence(l): If v ∈ V τ (Q′, l)\Pl, then v ∈ V τ (Q, l) and F τ (Q, l, v) = F τ (Q′, l, v).
We now prove by induction that Claim(l) is true for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r′. By Lemma B.3 (b)
and (c), V τ (Q, p) = V τ (Q′, p) and e(Q, p, v) = e(Q′, p, v) for each agent v ∈ V τ (Q, p)\i. Hence,
Claim(p) is true.
If r′ = p we are done. So, suppose r′ 6= p. Let l be a step such that p < l ≤ r′. Assume
Claim(g) is true for all g, p ≤ g < l ≤ r′. We prove that Claim(l) is true. Let v ∈ V τ (Q′, l)\Pl.
By (2) and (3), v ∈ V τ (Q′, l − 1)\Pl−1. From Consequence(l − 1),
F τ (Q, l − 1, v) = F τ (Q′, l − 1, v). (4)
From (2) and (3), v ∈ V τ (Q′, g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From Consequence(g) (p ≤ g < l),
F τ (Q, g, v) = F τ (Q′, g, v) for each step g, p ≤ g < l.
Together with (8) this implies
qQ,l−1s = q
Q′,l−1
s for s ∈ S ∩ v. (5)
Since v ∈ V τ (Q′, l), v is not removed at the end of step l− 1 in TTC(Q′). Then by (4) and (5),
v is also not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q). Hence, v ∈ V τ (Q, l).
Assume Claim(l) is not true, i.e., e(Q, l, v) 6= e(Q′, l, v). Let x = e(Q, l, v) and x′ = e(Q′, l, v).
Since v 6∈ Pl, x′ 6∈ Pl. By (2), x′ 6∈ Pl−1. By (3) and x′ ∈ V τ (Q′, l), x′ ∈ V τ (Q′, l − 1). By
Claim(l), x′ ∈ V τ (Q, l − 1). We distinguish between the following two subcases.
Case 2a: Agent x′ is removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
By x′ ∈ V τ (Q′, l− 1)\Pl−1 and Consequence(l− 1), F τ (Q, l− 1, x′) = F τ (Q′, l− 1, x′). Since at
step l − 1 of TTC(Q) agent x′ is removed, x′ is in some cycle C in Gτ (Q, l − 1). Hence, C is
also a cycle in Gτ (Q′, l − 1) and
C = F τ (Q, l − 1, x′) = F τ (Q′, l − 1, x′). (6)
From (2) and (3), x′ ∈ V τ (Q′, g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From Consequence(g) (p ≤ g < l),
F τ (Q, g, x′) = F τ (Q′, g, x′) for each step g, p ≤ g < l.
Together with (8) this implies
qQ,l−1s = q
Q′,l−1
s for s ∈ S ∩ x′. (7)
Recall that x′ is removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q). Then, by (6) and (7), x′ is
also removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q′). Hence, x′ 6∈ V τ (Q′, l), a contradiction with
x′ = e(Q′, l, v).
Case 2b: Agent x′ is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
Then, x′ ∈ V τ (Q, l). Since e(Q, l, v) = x and x 6= x′, we have xQvx′. Since v 6∈ Pl, v 6= i. Hence,
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since e(Q′, l, v) = x′, x 6∈ V τ (Q′, l). So, agent x was removed in some step g∗, 1 ≤ g∗ ≤ l − 1,
in TTC(Q′). In fact, by Lemma B.3(a), p ≤ g∗ ≤ l − 1. Note that no agent in Pr′ is removed
before the end of step r′. By (2), x 6∈ Pg∗ . Hence, x ∈ V τ (Q′, g∗)\Pg∗ . By an argument similar
to that of Case 2b, one shows that agent x is also removed at the end of step g∗ in TTC(Q).
Hence, x 6∈ V τ (Q, l), a contradiction with x = e(Q, l, v). 2
Lemma B.6 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q′i ∈ Q. Suppose there exists a student j ∈ I\i such
that τ(Q)(j) 6= τ(Q′)(j). Then,
(a) στ (Q, i) ≤ στ (Q, j) and [στ (Q, i) = στ (Q, j) only if i and j are assigned in the same cycle
in TTC(Q)], and
(b) στ (Q′, i) ≤ στ (Q′, j) and [στ (Q′, i) = στ (Q′, j) only if i and j are assigned in the same
cycle in TTC(Q′)].
Proof: By non-bossiness of τ , τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i). Let p and p′ be the steps at which student i
is assigned in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q′), respectively. Assume, without loss of generality, p ≤ p′.
By Lemma B.3(b), V τ (Q, p) = V τ (Q′, p) and
qQ,ps = q
Q′,p
s for each school s ∈ V τ (Q, p) ∩ S. (8)
By definition of p, p ≤ p′, and Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in Gτ (Q, p) but not
in Gτ (Q′, p).
We first prove (a). By Lemma B.3(b), for each student h ∈ I\i with στ (Q,h) < p or
στ (Q′, h) < p, τ(Q)(h) = τ(Q′)(h). Since τ(Q)(j) 6= τ(Q′)(j), there are r, r′ ≥ p (possibly
r 6= r′) with r = στ (Q, j) and r′ = στ (Q′, j). So, στ (Q, i) = p ≤ r = στ (Q, j). Suppose
στ (Q, i) = στ (Q, j). We have to show that j ∈ C. Suppose to the contrary that j 6∈ C. Then,
j ∈ C∗ for some cycle, say C∗, C∗ 6= C, of Gτ (Q, p). Note i 6∈ C∗. Since e(Q, p, v) = e(Q′, p, v)
for each agent v ∈ V τ (Q, p)\i, C∗ is also a cycle in Gτ (Q′, p). In particular, τ(Q)(j) = τ(Q′)(j),
a contradiction. This completes the proof of (a).
We now prove (b). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: j ∈ P τ (Q′, p, i).
Then, (b) follows directly from Lemma B.4 with Q¯ = Q′, v′ = j, and v = i.
Case 2: j 6∈ P τ (Q′, p, i).
Assume that (b) is not true. In other words, assume that στ (Q′, i) > στ (Q′, j) or [στ (Q′, i) =
στ (Q′, j) and i and j are assigned in different cycles in TTC(Q′)].
Note στ (Q, i) = p ≤ r′ = στ (Q′, j) ≤ στ (Q′, i) = p′. So, by Lemma B.5, if v ∈
V τ (Q′, r′)\(P τ (Q′, r′, i) ∪ i), then v ∈ V τ (Q, r′) and F τ (Q, r′, v) = F τ (Q′, r′, v).
By definition of r′, j ∈ V τ (Q′, r′). By Lemma B.4, j 6∈ (P τ (Q′, r′, i)∪i). Hence, j ∈ V τ (Q, r′)
and F τ (Q, r′, j) = F τ (Q′, r′, j). Since στ (Q′, j) = r′, student j forms part of a cycle, say C ′, in
Gτ (Q′, r′). Hence, C ′ = F τ (Q′, r′, j). So, also C ′ = F τ (Q, r′, j). Hence, student j is assigned to
the same school (or himself) in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q′), contradicting τ(Q)(j) 6= τ(Q′)(j). This
completes the proof of (b). 2
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Lemma B.7 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Let Q ∈ Eτ (P, k). Define
Q¯i := τ(Q)(i) for all i ∈ I. Then, Q¯ ∈ Eτ (P, 1) and τ(Q¯) = τ(Q). In other words, Oτ (P, k) ⊆
Oτ (P, 1).
Proof It is sufficient to prove the following claim:
Claim: Let P be a school choice problem. Let k ≥ 2, Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), and j ∈ I. Let Q˜j = τ(Q)(j).
Then, (Q˜j , Q−j) ∈ Eτ (P, k).
Indeed, if the above result holds true we can pick students one after another and eventually
obtain a profile Q˜ ∈ Eτ (P, k) where for all j ∈ I, Q˜j = τ(Q)(j). By construction, Q˜ ∈ Q(1)I .
So, Q˜ ∈ Eτ (P, 1). By repeated use of Lemma 7.4, τ(Q˜) = τ(Q). This proves that Oτ (P, k) ⊆
Oτ (P, 1).
Let Q˜ = (Q˜j , Q−j). Suppose to the contrary that Q˜ /∈ Eτ (P, k). Then there exist a student,
say i, and a list Q′i ∈ Q(k) such that
τ(Q′i, Q˜−i)Piτ(Qi, Q˜−i). (9)
By Lemma 7.4, τ(Q˜) = τ(Q). We claim that i 6= j. Suppose i = j. Then Q˜−i = Q˜−j = Q−j .
Hence, (9) becomes τ(Q′j , Q−j)Pjτ(Qj , Q−j) contradicting Q ∈ Eτ (P, k). So, i 6= j.
Let Q˜ = (Qi, Q˜j , Q−ij), Q˜′ = (Q′i, Q˜j , Q−ij), and Q
′ = (Q′i, Qj , Q−ij) . We can rewrite (9) as
τ(Q˜′) = τ(Q′i, Q˜j , Q−ij)Piτ(Qi, Q˜j , Q−ij) = τ(Q˜). (10)
By Q ∈ Eτ (P, k) and Lemma B.2, τ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). So, τ(Q˜) = τ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). By (10),
τ(Q˜′)(i) ∈ S. Let s = τ(Q˜′)(i). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: τ(Q′)(j) = τ(Q)(j). Recall that Q˜j = τ(Q)(j). So, Q˜j = τ(Q′)(j). Hence, Lemma 7.4
implies τ(Q′i, Q˜j , Q−ij) = τ(Q
′
i, Qj , Q−ij) and τ(Qi, Q˜j , Q−ij) = τ(Qi, Qj , Q−ij) . The left hand
side and right hand side of (10) can then be replaced to obtain τ(Q′i, Qj , Q−ij)Piτ(Qi, Qj , Q−ij) .
So, Q /∈ Eτ (P, k), a contradiction.
Case 2: τ(Q′)(j) 6= τ(Q)(j). We claim that τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q˜′)(i). To prove this, suppose to the
contrary that τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q˜′)(i). Since τ(Q˜) = τ(Q), (10) boils down to τ(Q′)Piτ(Q), which
implies that Q /∈ Eτ (P, k), a contradiction. So, τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q˜′)(i).
Notice that for any student h 6= i, Q′h = Qh. So, by Lemma B.6, στ (Q′, i) ≤ στ (Q′, j).
Notice also that for any student h 6= j, Q˜′h = Q′h. So, by Lemma B.6, στ (Q′, j) ≤ στ (Q′, i).
So, στ (Q′, j) = στ (Q′, i). From Lemma B.6 it follows that i and j are in the same cycle
when executing the TTC algorithm with the list profile Q′. So, i and j are not in self-cycles.
In particular, i is assigned to a school. Since Q′i = s we have τ(Q
′)(i) = s. By definition,
s = τ(Q˜′)(i). So, τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q˜′)(i), a contradiction.
Since both Case 1 and Case 2 yield a contradiction, we conclude that Q˜ ∈ Eτ (P, k). 2
Proof of Proposition 7.6:
Mechanism τ is strategy-proof. Hence, P ∈ Eτ (P,m). By Lemma B.7, τ(P ) ∈ Oτ (P, k) for any
1 ≤ k ≤ m. 2
Now Proposition 7.1 follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 7.1:
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From Lemma B.2, Oτ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ). We now prove that also Oτ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) ∩ NW (P ).
By Proposition 7.6 we may assume k = 1. Let Q ∈ Eτ (P, 1). Suppose to the contrary that
τ(Q) is wasteful, i.e., there is a student i ∈ I and a school s ∈ S such that |τ(Q)(s)| < qs and
sPiτ(Q)(i). Let Q′i = s. We show that τ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = s. (Since this contradicts Q ∈ Eτ (P, 1)
we are done.)
First observe that Q′i = s contains only school s. Hence, if τ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) ∈ S, then
τ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s. So, suppose τ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = i. By definition of the TTC algorithm, in
TTC(Q′) all seats of school s are assigned to other students. So, |τ(Q)(s)| < qs = |τ(Q′)(s)|.
Hence, there exists a student j ∈ S, j 6= i, such that τ(Q′)(j) = s and τ(Q)(j) 6= s. Since
Q′j = Qj ∈ Q(1) and τ(Q′)(j) = s, we have Qj = Q′j = s. Hence, τ(Q)(j) = j. By defini-
tion of the TTC algorithm, in TTC(Q) all seats of school s are assigned to other students. In
other words, at the end of of TTC(Q) school s has no available seats. So, |τ(Q)(s)| = qs, a
contradiction. 2
In order to prove Theorem 6.6 we need the following lemmas.
Lemma B.8 Let f be a cyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there is a profile of
student preferences P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γτ (P, k), i.e., for some
Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), τ(Q) 6∈ S(P ).
Proof : By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006a), there is a school choice problem P such that τ(P )
is not stable. Since τ is group strategy-proof, P ∈ Eτ (P,m). Hence, by Corollary 7.6, τ(P ) ∈
Oτ (P,m) = Oτ (P, k). Hence, there is a list profile Q ∈ Q(k)I such that Q ∈ Eτ (P, k) and
τ(Q) = τ(P ) 6∈ S(P ). 2
Lemma B.9 Let f be an acyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any profile
of student preferences P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γτ (P, k) are stable, i.e., for all
Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), τ(Q) ∈ S(P ). Moreover, S(P ) ⊆ Oτ (P, k).
In order to prove Lemma B.9 we need the following result due to Kesten (2006).
Lemma B.10 (Kesten, 2006a, Lemma 1)
If a priority structure contains a strong cycle, then it also contains a cycle.
Proof of Lemma B.9:
LetQ ∈ Eτ (P, k). By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), τ = γ. Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k) and τ(Q) = γ(Q).
By Lemma B.10, f does not contain a strong cycle. Hence, by Proposition 6.3 (for k = 1) or
Theorem A.3 (for k ≥ 2), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). Finally, from τ = γ and Proposition 6.1 it follows that
S(P ) ⊆ Oτ (P, k). 2
Proof of Theorem 6.6:
Follows immediately from Lemmas B.8 and B.9. 2
28
C Appendix: Proofs Section 8
Proof of Lemma 8.1:
Let ϕ = γ, τ . The result follows directly from the strategy-proofness of γ (Dubins and Freed-
man, 1981; Roth, 1982) and τ (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) by using Q′i as student i’s
“true preferences:” ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) is ranked higher than ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) by Q
′
i, hence ϕ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i)
is ranked higher than ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) by Pi. 2
Proof of Lemma 8.2:
Let ϕ = γ, τ . From Lemma 8.1 it follows that P ki is weakly k-dominates any strategy that is
obtained from P ki by interchanging the positions of the (acceptable) schools. So, let Qi ∈ Q(k)
be any other strategy. Note that Qi contains a school that is not in P ki . In fact, by Lemma 8.1
we can assume that the schools in Qi are listed in the true order (i.e., for any two schools s and s′
listed in Qi, sQ′is
′ ⇒ sPis′). We claim that either ϕ(P ki , Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Q)(i) for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i
or ϕ(P ki , Q
′
−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i) for some Q
′
−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. (This completes the proof as this shows
that no strategy k-dominates P ki .)
Suppose that not ϕ(P ki , Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Q)(i) for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. We have to show that
ϕ(P ki , Q
′
−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i) for some Q
′
−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. We know that for some Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i,
ϕ(P ki , Q−i)(i) 6= ϕ(Q)(i). Clearly, if ϕ(P ki , Q−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i), then we are done. So, suppose
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)Piϕ(P ki , Q−i). Then, ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) ∈ S. Let s′ = ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) and S′ = {s ∈ S :
sQis
′}. By definition of the DA-algorithm/TTC-algorithm, there are at least n′ = ∑s∈S′ qs
students. Let Q′−i ∈ Q(k)I\i be such that for each s ∈ S′, exactly qs students have a list that
consists of s only. The other n − n′ students have the empty list. Now one easily verifies that
ϕ(P ki , Q
′
−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i). This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 8.6:
By definition of the DA-algorithm, |M(γ(P k))| ≤ |M(γ(P ))|. We complete the proof by showing
that if i ∈ M(γ(P )), then γ(P k)(i)Riγ(P )(i). (Since γ(P ) ∈ IR(P ), γ(P k)(i) ∈ S. Hence,
i ∈M(γ(P k)). But then M(γ(P k)) =M(γ(P )).)
Let i ∈ M(γ(P )). Denote s = γ(P )(i) ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that sPiγ(P k)(i). Let
Q′i = s. By Lemma A.1, γ(Q
′
i, P−i)(i) = s. By a result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985, Theorem
2) extended to the college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 5.34), Q′i
ranks γ(Q′i, P
k
−i)(i) weakly higher than γ(Q
′
i, P−i)(i). Hence, γ(Q
′
i, P
k
−i)(i) = s, contradicting
the assumption that P k ∈ E(P, k). So, γ(P k)(i)Ris = γ(P )(i). 2
Proof of Proposition 8.7:
In Example 8.5, γ(P ) = {{i2, s3}, {i3, s2}, {i1}, {s1}} and τ(P ) = {{i1, s2}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s1}}.
So, |M(τ(P ))| = 3 > 2 = |M(γ(P ))|.
In Example 8.4, γ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s2}} and τ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s3}, {i2}, {s2}}.
So, |M(τ(P ))| = 2 < 3 = |M(γ(P ))|. 2
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